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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
OF LAYTON, Case No. 18324 
Plaintiff/Respondent, BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
vs. 
SCOTT L. EGBERT, MACK G. 
EGBERT and CORA EGBERT, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants, Mack and Cora Egbert, appeal from a decision 
granting respondents' motion for sunnnary judgment in the Second 
Judicial District Court, County of Davis, State of Utah, the 
Honorable J. Duffy Palmer presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondents' motion for summary judgment was granted after 
oral argument before the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, on December 
24, 1981. The final amended judgment was entered against Mack 
and Cora Egbert on February 25, 1982. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case involves a series of notes representing loans taken 
out by Scott Egbert from the First National Bank of Layton. The 
appellants, Mack and Cora Egbert, the parents of Scott Egbert, 
were co-signers on two of the loans. 
The first of these notes was signed by Scott Egbert and Mack 
Egbert on September 30, 1975, was in favor of the respondent and 
was in the amount of $9,171.60. The loan included interest at the 
rate of 12.5% and carried as security, the pledge of a 1976 Ford 
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pickup truck belonging to Scott Egbert. 
The second note was signed by Scott Egbert and Cora Egbert 
on September 17, 1976, again in favor of respondent, in the 
amount of $1,167.36. This note included interest at the rate of 
13.8% until the time of maturity, which was September 20, 1978, 
and a 10% interest rate thereafter. Scott Egbert's 1976 Ford 
pickup truck was also assigned as collateral on this loan. 
A third note was signed by Scott Egbert on June 16, 1977, 
in favor of the respondent in the amount of $350. This note 
carried an interest rate of 12%. 
On August 24, 1978, Scott Egbert executed a fourth promissory 
note in favor of the respondent in the amount of $13,957.92. This 
fourth note included an interest rate of 13.12%. This fourth note 
was a consolidation and refinancing of the prior three notes. It 
combined the amounts owed on the prior notes, which had not been 
paid in a timely manner, and included certain penalties and accrued 
interest from the prior notes. The fourth note also included 
unpaid charges for automobile insurance incurred on the truck 
posted as collateral on the prior notes and a charge for credit 
life insurance. The fourth promissory note was originally set up 
for the signatures of Scott Egbert and his wife, Pamela Egbert. 
However, Pamela Egbert did not sign the note. The note provided 
for equal monthly installment payments of $193.86, which would have 
paid off the loan in a period of six years. 
The loan disclosure statement attached to loan number four, 
was signed by Scott Egbert and indicated that the proceeds of the 
loan would be utilized to pay off the principal and interest of 
-2-
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the three prior loans, to pay the automobile insurance, provide 
credit life for the borrower and pay the various incidental fees 
and charges relating to making the loan. In addition, the loan 
disclosure statement indicated that the 1976 Ford pickup truck 
would be posted as collateral, and that the borrower would assign 
a certain real estate contract as security for the loan. A quit-
claim deed and an assignment of escrow covering the pledged real 
estate were signed by Scott Egbert, but were not signed by Pamela 
Egbert, who was a joint owner of the property. The respondent 
did not record the quit-claim deed, nor did it file the assignment 
of escrow with the escrow holder. 
The appellants, Mack and Cora Egbert, did not sign the fourth 
promissory note and were informed by Scott Egbert that the prior 
loans had been paid by the fourth promissory note and, therefore, 
appellants took no further action to insure payments on any of 
the loans. 
Limited payments were made on the first, second and third 
notes and no payments were made on the fourth note. At the time 
of the signing of the fourth note, the respondent stamped "cancelled 
by renewal" on the face of the first three notes. After Scott 
Egbert signed the note in August, 1978, the respondent made normal 
collection efforts related to the fourth note, which included 
repeated billings and letters to the signer, Scott Egbert, but 
made no attempts to collect from Mack and Cora Egbert. On February 
22, 1980, the respondent, through its attorney, instigated legal 
action against Mack Egbert, Cora Egbert and Scott Egbert, to enforce 
all four of the promissory notes, and pursuant to that action, 
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requested a writ of replevin to obtain possession of the motor 
vehicle. Scott Egbert voluntarily surrendered the vehicle to 
the respondent. 
In September, 1981, the respondent amended its complaint to 
exclude the fourth cause of action relating to the fourth promissory 
note and proceeded with collection procedures on the first, second 
and third promissory notes. After the denial of a motion for 
surmnary judgment made by the appellants, the respondent filed a 
motion for summary judgment on December 14, 1981, alleging that 
the fourth promissory note lacked consideration and, therefore, 
was invalid. Respondent further requested that judgment be granted 
against the appellants based upon the first and second promissory 
notes if the fourth note was determined by the court to be invalid. 
After hearing arguments of counsel on December 24, 1981, the 
Honorable J. Duffy Palmer granted respondent's motion for summary 
judgment. The final amended judgment was signed by the court on 
February 25, 1982, and was assessable only against Mack and Cora 
Egbert since Scott Egbert had filed a petition in bankruptcy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION EXISTS FOR 
THE FOURTH PROMISSORY NOTE AND THAT THE 
NOTE IS A VALID ENFORCEABLE OBLIGATION. 
As a general principle of law, there must be adequate 
consideration to support a note, whether it is a note extending a 
prior obligation, a note consolidating several prior obligations 
or an entirely new note. In order to constitute valid consideration 
for an extension of time for payment of a note or for an extension 
-4-
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of time to pay a consolidation of several notes, there must be 
either a benefit to the creditor or a detriment to the debtor. 
10 CJS, Bills & Notes, Sec. 160, Page 633; "The adequacy of the 
consideration is left to the discretion of the parties. However 
slight the benefit to the creditor or detriment to the debtor , 
provided it is susceptible of legal estimation, it is sufficient." 
85 ALR 328. 
In viewing the consideration necessary to support an extension 
of an existing note or an extension of several existing notes, it 
is necessary to look for a slightly different type of consideration 
since often additional money is not advanced as part of the 
extension or a consolidation arrangement. The advantages reaped 
by the lender in an extension situation normally include benefits 
to be realized in the future, such as increases in the interest 
rate, interest collectible over a longer period of time, additional 
security, inclusion of disputed items in the agreed upon loan amount 
and the convenience of collecting and administering one note rather 
than several notes. The detriment to the borrower in refinancing, 
consolidation or extension arrangements generally includes paying 
an increased rate of interest, paying interest on interest owed 
from a prior loan and paying interest for an extended period of 
time. 10 CJS, Bills & Notes, Sec. 160, Page 633, and 85 ALR 327. 
In the present case, consideration for the fourth summary or 
consolidation note took the following forms: 
1. The new note itself is a form of consideration. At the 
time the note was signed, Scott Egbert was behind in his payments 
on the prior three notes. The new note brought the bank records 
-5-
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current, got a new commitment from Scott Egbert to make the 
payment as required and consolidated the various payments on all 
of the notes into one note, for which one monthly payment was 
required. The convenience of administrating one loan rather than 
three loans is certainly a benefit to the lender. Outlining new 
terms and arranging a new method of payment has generally been 
accepted as a form of consideration for an extension or renewal 
note. 10 CJS, Bills & Notes, Sec. 160, Page 633. 
2. The loan disclosure statement attached to the loan in 
question, indicates that included in the principal amount of the 
note are certain charges incurred for automobile insurance for 
Scott Egbert in prior years. There is no evidence that these amounts 
had been agreed upon or accepted by Scott Egbert, and their inclusion 
in the fourth note constitutes a compromise and a firm agreement 
by Scott Egbert to pay the amounts and interest on the amounts 
over a period of six years. It is generally held that an agreement 
to pay disputed items or contested claims acts as good consideration 
for an extension or renewal agreement. 85 ALR 327, 10 CJS, Bills 
& Notes, Sec. 160, Page 633. 
3. The loan disclosure statement attached to the fourth 
promissory note further indicates that additional funds in the 
amount of $544, were advanced to cover credit life insurance for 
Scott Egbert. This amount is additional consideration advanced to 
Mr. Egbert, upon which he agreed to pay interest over the period 
of the loan. The credit life insurance was a benefit to Scott 
Egbert and would have also been a benefit to the respondent in the 
event of Scott's death, since the loan would then have been paid 
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by the insurance company. In addition, the bank was to receive 
interest on the amount advanced for credit life insurance over 
the period of the loan. 
4. Changes or alterations in the interest assessable have 
universally been held to be valid consideration for an extension 
agreement. In the present case, the modifications of interest 
took several forms. 
a. As set out in the Utah case of State Bank of Lehi v. 
Woolsey, 565 P2d 413 (Utah 1977), this court has ruled that the 
mere agreement to pay interest at the same rate as was previously 
charged for an extended period of time constitutes valid 
consideration for an extension or renewal agreement. In making 
this determination the court cited Williston on Contracts, 3rd 
Edition, Sec. 122, Pages 512 through 514, as follows: 
"'When a debtor and creditor agree 
that an interest bearing note shall 
be extended for a fixed time, the 
promise of each is of something 
detrimental, as the creditor promises 
to forbear the collection of his claim 
and the debtor gives up his power to 
stop the accrual of further interest 
by the payment of the principal at 
maturity. Accoringly, such agreements 
are generally upheld." Id at 416, 417. 
The court in State Bank of Lehi also cites as authority for 
this proposition, the Arizona case of Hackin v. First National 
Bank of Arizona, 419 P2d 529 (Arizona 1966.) This case involved 
a situation where a bank agreed to extend a note for a period of 
ninety days on the same terms as the original note. A short time 
after the beginning of the renewal period, the bank instigated 
action to collect on the original note. In rendering its decision 
-7-
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against the bank, the court indicated: 
"It is generally held that a debtor's 
pro~ise to pay interest during the 
entire period of extension, thereby 
relinquishing his right to pay less 
interest by sooner discharging the 
principal debt, is sufficient 
consideration for the creditor's 
promise to extend the time for 
payment of the note." 
Id at 530. 
The rule set out by these cases is one based on good logic. 
It would be an unworkable system if the court were to rule that 
all agreements renewing notes are invalid if the interest and 
terms remain basically the same. The consideration for such an 
arrangement or extension is the lender's desire to earn interest 
for an additional period of time and the borrower's right not to 
have to pay back the money for an extended period. 
In the present situation, the various notes and related charges 
and obligations were consolidated into one note. Scott Egbert 
agreed in that note to make payments over an extended period of 
six years, and further agreed to pay interest on the outstanding 
balance at a rate of 13.12%. The respondent certainly derives an 
' 
advantage by entering into an agreement whereby it will collect 
interest on an amount owed to it for an additional six years. 
b. At the ·time of the signing of the fourth promissory 
note, certain unpaid interest had accrued on the three prior 
promissory notes. These amounts of unpaid interest were accumulated 
and added into the principal of the fourth promissory note and 
interest was imputed into the fourth note on not only the principal 
of the original three notes, but also on the accumulated interest 
-8-
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on the original three notes. Therefore, the bank received the 
benefit of being promised in the fourth note, not only interest 
on the principal on the original three notes, but also interest 
on the interest assessed but not collected on the original three 
notes. Paying interest on interest in this manner has also been 
held to constitute valid consideration for an extension, renewal 
or consolidation agreement. 85 ALR 327, 329, 10 CJS, Sec. 160, Page 633. 
c. The fourth promissory note increased the interest 
rate to 13.12%. This is a substantial increase in the rate of 
interest payqble over the interest rates assessed in the prior 
three notes. The first note had carried an interest rate of 12.5%. 
The second note carried an interest rate of 13.8% until maturity, 
which was within a month of the signing of the fourth promissory 
note. After maturity, the second promissory note carried an 
interest rate of 10%. The third promissory note carried an interest 
rate of 12%. Therefore, the overall interest rate was increased 
between one-half and one percent over the interest collectible on 
the prior three notes. It is uniformally held that increases in 
the interest rate will act as valid consideration for an extension, 
renewal or consolidation of debt agreement. 85 ALR 327, 329, 10 CJS, 
Bills & Notes, Sec. 160, Page 633. 
5. The fourth note was secured by the same 1976 Ford pickup 
truck that secured the first three notes, and was also to be secured 
by an assignment of a real estate contract. Scott Egbert signed an 
assignment of escrow agreement and a quit-claim deed to certain 
property owned by he and his wife, Pamela Egbert. The bank did 
not record the quit-claim deed or provide the escrow holder with 
-9-
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a copy of the assignment of escrow. Had this action been taken, 
even though Pamela Egbert's signature did not appear on the 
assignment, any equity in the real estate contract belonging to 
Scott Egbert could have been obtained as security and eventually 
as payment on the fourth promissory note. The signing of the 
various documents as requested by the bank certainly gave to the 
bank the potential for additional security. The fact that the 
bank did not follow through properly to protect their collateral 
and to secure for themselves, the benefits of the sale of that 
collateral, does not alter the fact that consideration was given 
to the bank at the time the documents were signed by Scott Egbert. 
It is uniformally held that granting new collateral to secure 
a loan is valid consideration for an extension, renewal or 
consolidation of debt agreement. 85 ALR 327, 330, 10 CJS, Bills 
& Notes, Sec. 160, Page 633. 
As in any extension agreement, the consideration granted to 
the lender is not the same as the consideration granted on the 
initial note. However, as in the case of most extension agreements, 
in the present case there were substantial benefits reaped by the 
lender in exchange for extending the pay-back of the loan over a 
longer period of time. Of course, the respondent's consideration 
was primarily consideration to be received in the future as the 
note was collected. However, whether collected presently or 
promised in the future, the consideration is still valid and 
acceptable. 
POINT II 
WHETHER THE CONSIDERATION GIVEN FOR THE 
-10-
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SIGNING OF THE FOURTH PROMISSORY NOTE 
WAS AGREED UPON AND ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH 
PARTIES. 
There was certainly consideration in a number of forms 
granted to the bank at the time of the signing of the fourth 
promissory note. However, in presenting its argument for the 
summary judgment motion, the respondent agreed that any consideration 
must be in the form agreed upon and accepted by both parties. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that this is the law, a 
determination as to whether the consideration given at the 
execution of the fourth promissory note, was the consideration 
contemplated by the various parties, is a factual matter that must 
be determined by a trier of fact. 
Even though a factual dispute exists, there are a number of 
events clearly indicating that the parties intended the fourth 
promissory note to be effective, and that any consideration granted 
pursuant to that note was accepted by both parties. 
1. At the time the fourth note was signed, the first three 
notes were marked by the bank "cancelled by renewal." This 
certainly indicates that the bank no longer intended to look to 
the first three notes for collection, but instead, would enforce 
and collect the fourth promissory note since it fully encompassed 
all financial obligations between the parties after its execution 
date. If the fourth promissory note was not valid, as argued by 
the respondent, and if the consideration had not been accepted by 
the bank, it seems very strange that the first three notes would have 
been cancelled. 
2. After the signing of the fourth promissory note, the 
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normal payment documents were forwarded to Scott Egbert so that 
he could begin payments on the loan. When payments were not 
forthcoming, the bank instigated normal collection proceedings 
against Scott in an attempt to collect the fourth promissory note. 
Late charges were assessed on the fourth note when payments were 
not received, and those late charges were later written off as 
indicated on the face of the note. These are very curious 
procedures for a bank to take in order to collect an invalid note. 
3. No attempt was made to collect from Mack and Cora Egbert 
on the first and second promissory notes, thus indicating that 
the bank was looking to the fourth note as their means of collecting 
the obligation. 
4. When this suit was filed in February of 1980, a year and 
one~half after the signing of the fourth note, the bank still 
considered the fourth note valid and, therefore, filed action for 
default on the fourth note. A writ of replevin to obtain 
possession of the truck was sought by the bank based on all four 
of the promissory notes. No issue was raised in any of the 
original pleadings indicating that the bank did not consider the 
fourth promissory note effective. In fact, up to that point, 
diligent efforts had been made to collect on the fourth promissory 
note, including the instigation of legal action to collect the note. 
It was not until the respondent realized ·that there existed 
a potential argument as to the validity of the note, that it 
backtracked on its position and suddenly made the claim that the 
fourth promissory note should not be upheld because it was invalid 
from the beginning. This is a very strange argument in light of 
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the fact that from August of 1978, when the fourth note was 
signed, until the time the amended complaint was filed in 
September, 1981, a period of over three years, the bank made 
every possible effort to collect from Scott Egbert on the fourth 
promissory note. 
Whether the consideration granted and discussed above for 
the fourth promissory note was the type of consideration 
contemplated by the parties and whether that consideration was 
acceptable to the parties are questions that must be determined 
by a finder of fact after carefully analyzing the attitudes and 
intentions taken by both the signer, Scott Egbert and the 
respondent. 
POINT III 
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS ARE GRANTED WITH 
GREAT RELUCTANCE AND ONLY WHEN THERE 
ARE NO DISPUTED FACTS AND THE UNDISPUTED 
FACTS ARE CLEARLY IN FAVOR OF THE MOVING 
PARTY .. 
The general rule in the State of Utah is that summary judgments 
are not looked upon with a great deal of favor. Brandt v. Springville 
Banking Co., 353 P2d 460 (Utah 1960.) In order to grant a sunnnary 
judgment, it is necessary for a court to determine that there are 
no disputed facts and that the facts that do exist leave no issue 
that properly should be decided by a finder of fact. If there are 
facts in question that have not been determined through discovery 
and are yet to be presented at trial, then the judge's obligation 
is to allow the case to go to trial so that all of the facts can 
be submitted at the trial. Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & 
Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, 398 P2d 685 (Utah 1965), Rich v. McGovern, 
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551 P2d 1226 (Utah 1976.) Judge Palmer granted the respondent's 
motion for surrnnary judgment based on the fact that he found no 
consideration for the fourth promissory note. As a result of 
that ruling, the court found the first, second and third promissory 
notes to be valid and granted judgment against the appellants, Mack 
and Cora Egbert, based on the first and second promissory notes. 
The issues before the court, in this case, are whether there was 
consideration for the fourth promissory note, as discussed in 
Point I, and whether that consideration was as contemplated by 
the parties, as discussed in Point II. Before a final determination 
can be made in these areas, a number of disputed facts and unanswered 
questions must be determined by a trier of fact. Among these are: 
1. The reason for Pamela Egbert not signing the fourth 
promissory note and not signing the quit-claim deed and assignment 
of escrow. 
2. Whether Pamela's not signing the various documents 
impaired, in any way, the security granted to the respondent or 
whether it would have recovered whatever equity did exist in the 
contract by filing the document signed by Scott Egbert alone. 
3. What discussions and representations took place between 
Scott Egbert and the respondent regarding the validity of the fourth 
promissory note. 
4. What collection efforts were taken by the respondent to 
collect the fourth promissory note. 
5. Whether the fourth promissory note was considered by the 
bank, up until the time that an amended complaint was filed, as 
a valid and enforceable obligation. 
-14-
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Without the answers to these questions, it would be difficult 
to determine whether the consideration given to the bank was 
sufficient and as contemplated, when the fourth promissory note 
was signed. 
CONCLUSION 
This case comes before the court from an order issued by 
the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, granting respondent's motion for 
sunnnary judgment. The judge granted the summary judgment motion 
based on the fact that he found no consideration for a note signed 
on August 24, 1978, between Scott Egbert as borrower, and the First 
National Bank of Layton as lender, and, therefore, declared the 
note invalid. When this note was declared invalid, the respondent 
was further granted surmnary judgment on two prior notes, upon 
which the appellants are cosigners, and judgment was granted 
against appellants. 
Judge Palmer erred in finding that no consideration was given 
for the disputed promissory note. As is often the case in extension 
or consolidation arrangements, the consideration is somewhat 
different from the normal consideration granted when an original 
note is signed between a borrower and lender. However, the 
consideration is no less valid, even though it takes a different 
form than the consideration for an original note. It is clear 
that there was consideration granted for the extension or 
consolidation note, and that the consideration was in a form 
generally accepted as adequate to support an extension or 
consolidation agreement. 
The remaining question presented by this appeal is the 
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acceptance by the respondent of the consideration given. 
Pursuant to the guidelines set by this court for the granting 
of surmnary judgment motions, this question should be presented 
to a finder of fact for a determination as to whether the 
consideration was accepted by the parties, and for a determination 
as to the validity of the fourth promissory note. 
Appellants request that this case be remanded to the Second 
Judicial District Court for Davis County, State of Utah, for 
trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this /LI~ day of May, 1982. 
Q~~ 
Attorney for Appellants 
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